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Introduction:
The Aims of Privatization
George L. Priest·
Privatization refers to the shift from government provISIon of
functions and services to provision by the private sector. At base,
privatization is a set of strategies for making government more ef-
fective. Put in these terms, privatization should-and I predict
will-come to command widespread popular and political support;
which of our politicians has the nerve to advocate less effective gov-
ernment? For similar reasons, privatization has become the central
policy instrument of political interests as diverse as the Thatcher
government in Great Britain and the (formerly) socialist Labour
Party in New Zealand.
At the simplest level, privatization refers to the introduction of
incentives into the government production of services in order to
increase productive effectiveness. Most commonly, this means the
introduction of increased competition, not as an end in itself, but to
better focus the attention of individuals providing the government
service toward the ends that the service was meant to achieve.
In many cases, government ends can be achieved more effectively
by the substitution of a profit motive for the amorphous motives of a
government bureaucracy. Students of government have always had
difficulty identifying the motivational ethic of government bureau-
cracy. But if direct costs can be reduced or service enhanced, it
makes sense to substitute private for public management. Privatiza-
tion in this sense is hardly novel; the only issue is how far the policy
can be extended. For example, just as the U.S. Postal Service cur-
rently contracts rural delivery routes to private entrepreneurs in or-
der to increase efficiency, it may make sense to shift management of
military commissaries from civil service employees to large grocery
and appliance chains.
Copyright © 1988 by George L. Pries!. Not for quotation or allribUlion without permis-
sion of the author.
• John M. Olin Professor of Law and Economics. Yale Law School. Member, Presi-
dent's Commission on Privatization. I have no reason to believe that the views ex-
pressed here resemble those of any other member of the Commission or of the
Commission itself.
HeinOnline -- 6 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 2 1988
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 6:1,1988
The achievement of more effective government through privatiza-
tion, however, need not derive from the profit motive. The intro-
duction of competition itself into government provision of services
is likely to enhance government effectiveness. For example, the re-
quirement under the A-76 contracting-out program I that govern-
ment departments submit bids for the provision of the service in
competition with private sector bids is likely to encourage these de-
partments to consider ways to provide the services more effectively,
even if the government departments ultimately prevail over private
contractors in retaining the jobs. Similarly, the introduction of edu-
cational vouchers increasing parental choice is likely to enhance
school responsiveness even if voucher use is confined to the public
schools.
These examples illustrate that privatization through the introduc-
tion of competition or through greater reliance on the motivational
success of the private sector provides no inherent challenge to gov-
ernment objectives themselves. Thus, a very large range of priva-
tization initiatives offers no grounds for political controversy.
In many other contexts, however, privatization will become con-
troversial because the provision of more effective government serv-
ices challenges entrenched interests or government subsidies that
are no longer politically justified. At a minimum, the introduction
of competition through the prospect of privatization will serve to
identify the extent of government subsidization. Privatization can be
expected to be challenged on these grounds alone because for many
subsidies identification is equivalent to normative critique, where
either past political support or current rationale has vanished.
In other instances, however, privatization, by identifying a sub-
sidy, will open debate over the subsidy's existence, its magnitude, or
the form in which it is provided. Here, again, the view that priva-
tization threatens the subsidy's beneficiaries may easily be mistaken.
For example, military employees have challenged the privatization
of military commissaries on the grounds that the current subsidy
provided through the below-cost and untaxed sale of groceries, sun-
dries, and appliances could not survive if commissary services were
provided by the private sector. This position, however, mistakes the
form of the subsidy for its substance. If commissary services could
be provided at lower real cost to the government, the opportunity to
subsidize military employee purchases with no increase in the mili-
I. Discussed il/fra Tingle, Privatization and the Reagan Administration: Ideology
and Applicatioll, 6 Yale Law & Pol'y Rev. 229 (1988).
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tary budget would be enhanced.:! More realistically, commissary
privatization raises the important issue of the continued justification
of supplementing the military pay package indirectly through below-
cost product sales-differentially attractive to heavy consumers-
.rather than directly through salary and pension benefits.
Of course, in many circumstances privatization is a direct chal-
'lenge to the existence of a subsidy. The many proposals to privatize
Amtrak, for example, may be, in essence, little more than direct at-
.tacks on the continued subsidy of intercity passenger rail service.
Some commentators have claimed that none of the Amtrak lines is or
can ever be profitable. If so, the shift of the provision of passenger
rail service to the private sector will dictate the abandonment of
.servICe.
It must be acknowledged that in the complex world of govern-
ment finance, some privatization proposals themselves can serve as
a form of subsidy. Many privatization initiatives, for example, in-
volve proposals to sell government assets, whether public lands, pe-
troleum reserves, or loan assets. The government does not
currently maintain financial records that account for asset values or
for the current stream of income or services from them. The legiti-
mate privatization question with respect to asset sales is whether, in
terms of national income (or equivalent services, for example, in the
case of National Parks), the asset can be more productively managed
by the public or private sector. Many asset sale proposals, however,
envision using the proceeds of the asset sale to offset the current
annual budget deficit. 3 If implemented over the long term, such
proposals would be the equivalent of selling one's house to meet the
fire insurance premium. More precisely, asset diversion of this na-
ture represents a not-so-hidden subsidy to current spending and the
current tax level.
The most basic issue raised by the privatization movement is the
identification of the irreducible core of governmental activity. Con-
sidered carefully, the irreducible core of government is quite small:
the administration ofjustice, including the control of discrimination
and externalities; and the provision of pure public goods, including
defense. The government, of course, is also the most effective insti-
2. Obviously, the government could continue below-cost product sales in the con-
text of private sector commissary management only if it were to specify a product price
package and then franchise commissary operation to the lowest private bidder.
3. See Tingle, supra note I, at 247-256.
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tution for redistributing income to the poor and the disabled."
These government objectives privatization does not question.
Privatization, rather, challenges all other governmental activities to
determine how the basic core of governmental objectives can more
effectively be achieved.
The articles in this issue of the Yale Law & Policy Review explore
several issues raised by privatization, ranging from its theoretical
bases to its applications in policy decisions, in our system ofjustice,
and as a labor strategy. Paul Starr's Article, "The Meaning of Priva-
tization," provides a very helpful survey of the ideology of privatiza-
tion. In Stan's view, privatization as a political movement
represents a fundamental, and perhaps ill-advised reordering of pri-
orities. To my mind, Stan's survey views privatization from the ex-
cessively narrow prospect of current U.S. conservative support, thus
placing insufficient emphasis on the broader sources of commitment
to more effective government that the privatization movement com-
mands internationally. Geoffrey C. Hazard's and Paul D. Scott's
"The Public Nature of Private Adjudication" addresses one aspect
of what I have referred to as the irreducible core of governmental
activity: the limits on the extent to which the provision ofjustice can
be shifted from public to private fora. Hazard and Scott conclude
that the validity of any tribunal ofjustice depends, ultimately, on the
approval and acceptance of the community. "Private" justice is jus-
tice, then, only to the extent that it furthers public values. Peter J.
Ferrara's "Medicare and the Private Sector" is an excellent illustra-
tion of privatization in practice, in this case demonstrating how
Medicare benefits can be redefined and reorganized through priva-
tization to extend basic medical care coverage with minimum addi-
tional fiscal support. Ferrara demonstrates brilliantly how
privatization, far from challenging the basic values implicated in a
government program, can seek to achieve those values more
effectively.
Finally, Craig Becker's "With Whose Hands: Privatization and
Public Employment" provides an example of how groups affected
by privatization-here government employees-confuse the protec-
tion of their personal pecuniary and employment interests with the
larger privatization goal of more effective government. In Becker's
view, privatization is at odds with the democratic nature of our civil
4. For a discussion of the critical role that government subsidies and lax inccntivcs
play in fostering low-income housing. see infra Stearns, The Low-Income Housing- Tax
Credit: A Poor Solution to the Housing Crisis, 6 Yale Law & Po!'y Rev. 203 (19HH).
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service system: It threatens to erode employment gains made by
women and minorities in government service, and to eliminate a
public workforce that, unlike the private workforce, is free to criti-
cize employer policies without fear of retaliation. Becker's principal
complaint derives from his observation that the shift of government
functions from the public to the private sector often results in re-
duced wages, benefits, and job security without improving the qual-
ity of the service provided. Here, privatization conflicts not with
societal ideals, but with the personal interests of affected parties.
Employees who wish to view the current wage level as vested, op-
pose reduction in wages for the same services. In contrast, taxpay-
ers who ultimately must pay these wages or citizens committed to
the most effective extension of governmental activities, support the
reduction in wages from privatization as a substantial positive
achievement.
Becker's simple comparison of the proportion of women and mi-
norities in the public and private sectors misses the point. The
more accurate empirical comparison is between the proportion of
women and minorities in specific governmental services, before and
after the services were privatized. There is no necessary link be-
tween privatization and the employment of women and minorities
nor between privatization and the suppression of free speech.
Moreover, free speech as well as women and minority employment
can-and should-be protected in any privatization initiative by
supplementary regulation.
By itself, privatization need not deflect the goals to which our so-
ciety aspires. Indeed, in many contexts, privatization can serve to
extend those goals by seeking to achieve them more effectively. Not
all of government activity, however, can be defended by norms com-
manding widespread acceptance. Privatization helps to identify
those who gain and those who lose from the current provision of
governmental services. Privatization becomes controversial when
those who gain from the current structure of government are no
longer the legitimate beneficiaries of the public fisc.
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